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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

o SYNOPSIS

This case is about Ramp Realty of Florida, Inc.'s (hereinafter Ramp Realty)
efforts to get information from Google, Inc. (hereinafter Google) about why a
Google Maps Places webpage incorrectly said a self storage business owned by
Ramp Realty was "permanently closed." Ramp Realty believes someone illegally
either hacked Ramp Realty's computers, Google's computers, or supplied Google
with false information for the purpose of manipulating Google's Places listing for
the storage business. Accordingly, Ramp Realty filed a pure bill of discovery so it
could serve a subpoena on Google to obtain information about why and how
Google's listing for Ramp Realty's storage business was changed to say the
business was permanently closed.
Google contends that a contract entered into between Ramp Realty and
Google months after Google's listing for the storage company was changed
governs where Ramp Realty can file its bill of discovery, even though the bill only
seeks information about things that happened before Google and Ramp Realty had
a contractual relationship. Ramp Realty, on the other hand, contends that,
according to its plain language, the contract only dictates where Ramp Realty must
assert claims against Google concerning services Google provides under the
contract. Since Ramp Realty's pure bill of discovery concerns events that happened

in February 2012 (or earlier) that have nothing to do with the contractual services
Google started providing in May 2012, the contract does not dictate where Ramp
Realty must file its bill of discovery.

o

BACKGROUND FACTS

Ramp Realty owns and operates a self-storage business named St. Johns
Storage. (R. at 1; 50.) Sometime before April 26, 2012, the Google Maps Places
listing for St. Johns Storage was changed to say "This place is permanently
closed." (R. at 2; 50.) A partial screenshot ofthe Places listing webpage taken on
April 24, 2012 is below (R. at 38.)
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The permanently closed statement appears just below the words" St Johns
Storage."
Ramp Realty does not know when the Places listing was changed. (See R. at
2.) Based on materials filed by Google, Google believes it changed the listing
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sometime around February 15, 2012. (R. at 24.) Based on Ramp Realty's estimated
business losses of $300,000, Ramp Realty believes the listing was changed to say
St. Johns Storage was "permanently closed" before February 15,2012. (See R. at
2.)
Ramp Realty believes someone other than Google illegally either hacked
Ramp Realty's computers, Google's computers, or supplied Google with false
information for the purpose of manipulating Google's Places listing for St. Johns
Storage. (R. at 2.) On April 26, 2012, Ramp Realty contacted Google to ask how
Ramp Realty could get the details behind how and why the Google Maps Places
listing came to say that Ramp Realty was "permanently closed." (R. at 50.) On
May 1, 2012, Google Legal Support responded and told Ramp Realty to serve
Google with a "subpoena or other appropriate legal process." (R. at 49.) Google
Legal Support did not say anything at all about any requirements to file an action
in Santa Clara County, any requirements to have the subpoena issued out of Santa
Clara County, or any Google terms or conditions that might apply to Ramp Realty.

(R. at 49.)
On May 9, 2012, Ramp Realty and Google entered into a contract under
which Ramp Realty could control some aspects of its Google Maps listing. (R. at
25.) Entering into this contract allowed Ramp Realty to have the "this place is
permanently closed" statement removed from St. Johns Storage's Google Maps
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Places listing. (See R. at 25.) This contract is called "Google Terms of Service"
and it contains the forum selection clause on which Google based its motion to
dismiss. (R. at 9; 29.) The forum selection clause simply says "All claims arising
out of or relating to these terms or the Services will be litigated in the federal or
state courts of Santa Clara County, California, USA .... " (R. at 33.)
On June 26, 2012, Ramp Realty filed a pure bill of discovery in Duval
County, Florida that sought to discover the "how and why the false statements
were made and at whose bequest the false statements were put on the websites."
(R. at 1-3.) The false statements of course were put on the Google Maps listing
around February 15,2012, according to Google, or even earlier according to Ramp
Realty. (R. at 24.) Ramp Realty's pleading did not allege any misconduct on
Google's part and did not seek any relief, monetary or otherwise, against Google.
(R. at 1-3.) The complaint sought only discovery. (R. at 1-3.) At the time the false
statements were put on the Google Maps listing, Ramp Realty and Google had no
contractual relationship, and Google was not providing any services whatsoever to
Ramp Realty. (See R. at 24-25.) The trial court dismissed this action based solely
on the plain language of the forum selection clause. (R. at 52-53.)
o PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ramp Realty began this action when it filed its pure bill of discovery in the
Circuit Court for Duval County on June 26,2012. (R. at 1-3.) On September 6,
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2012, Google moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for improper venue
based on the forum selection clause, and for Ramp Realty's alleged violation of the
Florida fictitious name act. (R. at 9.) Google argued Ramp Realty failed to state a
claim because Ramp Realty was really on a fishing expedition. (R. at 16-18).
Google also argued that Ramp Realty could not maintain the action because it had
not registered a fictitious name for its storage business. (R. at 20-21.)1
On December 13,2012, the trial court held a hearing on Google's motion to
dismiss. (See R. at 46.i On February 13,2013, the trial court entered an order
dismissing the action. (R. at 52-53.) The order did not address Google's arguments
that Ramp Realty failed to state a claim or failed to comply with the fictitious name
act. (R. at 52-53.) Instead, the dismissal relied solely on the forwn selection clause
in Google's terms of service. (R. at 52-53.) Ramp Realty appealed the dismissal.
(R. at 51.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court's order dismissing Ramp Realty's action relied solely on the
forum selection clause in Google's terms of service. The forum selection clause

Ramp Realty has since registered the fictitious name St. Johns Storage for its selfstorage business.
2 The index to the record shows that the Affidavit of Jeb T. Branham was filed on
February 14, 2013. The Affidavit was served on December 13, 2012, the date of
the hearing on Google's motion to dismiss. The original affidavit was tendered to
the court for filing during the hearing. Google's counsel attended the hearing
telephonically and received his email service of the Affidavit prior to the hearing.
I
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says "All claims arising out of or relating to these terms or the Services will be
litigated in the federal or state courts of Santa Clara County, California, USA .... "
The contract defines Services simply as Google's "products and services .... "
Ramp Realty's bill of discovery seeks only discovery about how and why S1.
Johns Storage's Google Maps Places listing was changed to falsely say S1. Johns
Storage was "permanently closed." Google admits that, as far is it can tell, Google
changed S1. Johns Storage's Google Maps Places listing sometime around
February 15,2012. Google also admits it and Ramp Realty did not enter into a
contract that incorporated Google's terms of service until May 9,2012, months
after Google changed the Places listing for S1. Johns Storage.
At the time Google changed

st. Johns Storage's Places listing to falsely say

the "location is permanently closed[,]" Google was not providing any Services to
S1. Johns Storage. Google published the Places listing on its own accord and for
Google's own benefit to drive traffic to Google's sites so Google could sell ads on
those sites. Prior to May 9, 2012, the existence and content ofthe Places listing
was not the result of any business or contractual relationship between Google and
Ramp Realty.
By its plain language, Google's forum selection clause applies only to
claims that arise out of or relate to the terms of service or the Services themselves.
First, Ramp Realty does not have a "claim." It is not seeking any relief against
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Google. It is seeking only discovery. Second, Ramp Realty's bill of discovery does
not arise out of or relate to either Google's terms of service or any Services Google
provided to Ramp Realty. Ramp Realty's bill of discovery concerns only how St.
Johns Storage's Places listing got changed months before Google started providing
Services to Ramp Realty and months before Ramp Realty was subject to the forum
selection clause in Google's terms of service. Accordingly, Ramp Realty's bill of
discovery is not subject to Google's forum selection clause.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE PRESENTED: Did the trial court err when it decided a contract entered into on
May 9, 2012 dictates where a plaintiff must file a pure bill of discovery to obtain
information about things that happened months earlier and that have nothing to do
with the business relationship created by the contract?
o A DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIES.

This Court should review the trial court's dismissal of Ramp Realty's action
under a de novo standard of review. Bombardier Capital, Inc. v. Progressive
Marketing Group, Inc., 801 So. 2d 131, 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) In construing a
forum selection clause, the Fourth District said "The interpretation or construction
of a contract is a matter of law and an appellate court is not restricted from
reaching a construction contrary to that of the trial court. /I Id. (emphasis added).
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o

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF GOOGLE'S FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE SHOWS
THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CLAUSE TO HAVE A LIMITED SCOPE.

"The polestar guiding the court in the construction of a written contract is
the intent ofthe parties. [cit. omitted.] Where, as here, the language used is clear
and unambiguous the parties' intent must be garnered from that language." Id. In
Food Marketing Consultants, Inc. v. Sesame Workshop, the Southern District of
Florida "dr[ew] several lessons" from distilling numerous forum selection clause
cases. 2010 WL 1571206, *12-l3 (S.D. Fla. 2010). Among the lessons was the rule
that "whether a particular phrasing of a forum-selection clause covers a given
cause of action ... depends on the relationship of the claim in question to the
contract containing the forum-selection clause .... " Id. (emphasis added).
The question for the instant case thus becomes whether the plain language or
"particular phrasing" of Google's forum selection clause shows the parties
objectively intended Google's forum selection clause to apply to all legal
proceedings between the parties regardless of the type of proceeding or when or
how the matters at issue in the proceeding occurred. See Armco, Inc. v. North Atl.
Ins. Co. Ltd., 68 F. Supp2d 330,338 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("'[t]he applicability ofa
forum selection clause is governed by 'objective consideration ofthe language' of
the clause"').
The forum selection clause in Google' s tenus of service merely says "All
claims arising out of or relating to these terms or the Services will be litigated in
8
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the federal or state courts of Santa Clara County, California, USA .... " (R. at 33.)
The contract defines Services simply as Google's "products and services ... " (R.
at 29.)
Broken down, the plain language of Google's forum selection clause limits
the clause's application to legal actions that meet the following requirements:
1. The action must be a "claim;"
and
2. The action must arise out of or relate to the terms of
serVIce; or
3. The action must arise out of or relate to the Services.
Despite the contract's plain language, Google is trying to make the forum selection
clause apply to any legal proceedings between Google and Ramp Realty regardless
of the nature of the proceedings or the lack of a connection between the
proceedings and Ramp Realty's contractual relationship with Google.

If Google had wanted to make Ramp Realty agree to only pursue legal
process against Google in Santa Clara County for all things regardless of when the
events occurred or their context, Google's terms of service could have easily said
something like "You agree that from this date forward you will only pursue legal
process against Google in the federal or state courts of Santa Clara County,
California, USA, regardless ofthe subject matter ofthe legal proceedings or when
the events underlying the proceedings happened." Google chose not to do this.
Instead, Google used much narrower language that limited the application ofthe
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forum selection clause to claims that arise out of or relate to Google's
contractually-provided Services or the terms of service themselves.
There is simply nothing in the language of the forum selection clause that
establishes any party's objective intent to apply the clause to pre-contractual events
that do not concern Google's Services provided under the contract or the terms of
service themselves. As stated in Bombardier Capital, "[T]he polestar guiding the
court ... is the intent ofthe parties .... Where ... the language is clear and
unambiguous, the parties' intent must be garnered from that language." 801 So.2d
at 134.
o RAMP REALTY'S BILL OF DISCOVERY IS NOT A "CLAIM."
The plain language of Google' s forum selection clause first limits the
clause's application to "claims." Words used in a contract "must be given their
plain and ordinary meaning .... One looks to the dictionary for the plain and
ordinary meaning of words." Beans v. Chohonis, 740 So. 2d 65,67 (Fla. 3d DCA
1999) (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE).
A "claim" in its noun form is "A demand or request for something as one's rightful
due: file a claim for losses. " THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DESK DICTIONARY (1981),
p. 191 (emphasis supplied). Ramp Realty's bill of discovery is not a "claim" within
any ordinary sense of the word. It does not seek damages or injunctive relieffrom
Google. The bill only seeks a way to obtain information from Google.
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Indeed, filing the bill of discovery is exactly what Google told Ramp Realty
to do. When Ramp Realty asked Google how it could find out why St. Johns
Storage's Maps listing was changed to say "this location is permanently closed[,]"
Google told Ramp Realty to serve Google with "a valid third party subpoena or
other appropriate legal process." (R. at 49.) (emphasis added.) The bill of
discovery Ramp Realty filed is "other appropriate legal process." The bill of
discovery is not a "claim." Since the bill is not a "claim," there is no way Google's
forum selection clause can apply to the bill in the first place.
o RAMP REALTY'S BILL OF DISCOVERY DOES NOT ARlSE OUT OF OR
RELATE TO GOOGLE'S TERMS OF SERVICE.

Ramp Realty's bill of discovery has nothing to do with the contents ofthe
terms of service. The bill of discovery arises out of and relates to changes Google
made of its own accord or at a third-party's behest to St. Johns Storage's Google
Maps Places listing months before Ramp Realty became subject to Google's terms
of service. The bill of discovery is not seeking a declaration of the terms of service,
it does not claim Google violated the terms, and it does not even challenge the
application ofthe terms to the business relationship between Ramp Realty and
Google that started on May 9, 2012.
The fact that Google made no mention whatsoever of the terms of service
when Ramp Realty asked Google in April 2012 how to obtain the information it
sought establishes that even Google did not think Ramp Realty's request for
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information related to or arose out of Google's terms of service. Google's current
efforts to use its forum selection clause to dodge Ramp Realty's bill of discovery
does not ipso facto turn Ramp Realty'S bill into a dispute over Google's terms of
service either. Such an application of the forum selection clause would undo the
very limitations Google itself wrote into the clause.

o RAMP REALTY'S BILL OF DISCOVERY DOES NOT ARISE OUT OF OR
RELATE TO GOOGLE'S SERVICES.

Although Florida courts generally uphold forum selection clauses, the courts
still require the legal proceedings subject to the clause to concern the business
relationship that arises from the contract with the forum selection clause in it.

Management Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., inc., 743 So. 2d
627,632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066,
1070 (lIth Cir. 1987); Food Marketing Consultants, Inc. v. Sesame Workshop,
2010 WL 1571206, *12-13 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Armco, Inc. v. NorthAtl. Ins. Co.

Ltd., 68 F. Supp2d 330,338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
In Management Computer Controls, this Court refused to apply a forum
selection clause to a Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim in
part because the FUDTPA claim did not "arise out of the contract .... " 743 So. 2d
at 632 (the court also found the forllin selection clause undermined the purpose of
FUDTPA). Wbile upholding a forum selection clause that applied to "any 'case or
controversy arising under or in connection with this Agreement[,]'" the 11th Circuit
12

still recognized that such broad language only captured "causes of action arising
directly or indirectly from the business relationship evidenced by the contract."

Stewart Org., 810 F.2d at 1010 (emphasis omitted). In Food Marketing
Consultants, the Southern District of Florida discerned that "whether a ... forumselection clause covers a given cause of action ... depends on the relationship of
the claim in question to the contract containing the forum-selection clause .... "
2010 WL 1571206 at *12-13.

Armco, Inc. best illustrates the relationship between pre-contract events and
the application of a forum selection clause to those events. 68 F. Supp2d at 338-39.

In Armco, the Southern District of New York refused to apply a forum selection
clause to tort claims concerning events that occurred before the parties entered into
a contract with a forwn selection clause, even though the events eventually led to
the parties entering into that contract. The forum selection clause at issue in Armco
said "the parties irrevocably submit themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
English Courts to settle any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with
this Agreement." Id. at 338. In finding the forum selection clause inapplicable to
the tort claims, the Armco court explained:
Plaintiffs are not suing for breach of the Sale Contract,
alleging any lack of performance required by the Sale
Contract, or disputing either party's rights or obligations
under the Sale Contract. ...
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Here, the plaintiffs assert tort claims that also allegedly
grew out of events and acts by defendants preceding the
execution ofthe contract. .. , These allegations predate
the signing and negotiation of the sale agreement, and do
not arise from its terms.
68 F. Supp.2d at 338-39.
Although Ramp Realty's bill of discovery is by no means a tort claim against
Google, the instant case otherwise mirrors Armco. Just as in Armco, Ramp Realty
is seeking discovery about things that happened before Ramp Realty contracted
with Google, and Ramp Realty's sought-after discovery does not concern any
alleged breach ofthe contract by Google, Google's performance ofthat contract, or
either parties' rights or obligations under that contract.
Google freely acknowledges that the terms of service did not apply to Ramp
Realty until May 9, 2012. CR. at 26.) In an affidavit submitted by Google to support
its motion to dismiss, Google explained that Ramp Realty became subject to the
terms of service on May 9, 2012 when Ramp Realty established a Local Business
Center account with Google. CR. at 25.? The purpose of establishing the Local

In its affidavit, Google identified Ramp Realty as "the user with the email address
'burganjax@aol.com' ...." The email address burganjax@aol.com is an email
address used primarily by Grover Burgan, Ramp Realty's president. Obviously,
Google does not dispute that "the user with the email address
'burganjax@aol.com'" was authorized to act on behalf of and bind Ramp Realty
since Google's entire argument depends on that "user" binding Ramp Realty to the
terms of service.

3
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Business Center account is, as explained by Google, to allow a business owner to
"submit merchant-verified edits to a business listing" within Google Maps. (R. at
25.) In other words, establishing the account with Google allowed Ramp Realty to
exercise some control over its Maps listing, such as changing the statement that St.
Johns Storage was permanently closed.
Google's terms of services defines Services as "our products and services[.]"
(R. at 29.) Prior to May 9, 2012, Google did not provide any Services to Ramp
Realty. (See R. at 25.) Google admits Ramp Realty did not agree to the terms of
service until May 9, 2012. (R. at 25.) Indeed, the first thing Google's terms of
services says is "Welcome to Google." (R. at 29.) The Google Places listing for St.
Johns storage that existed prior to May 9, 2012 was a product Google produced of
its own accord to drive traffic to Google's websites so Google could sell
advertising. Google calls this "an unverified Google Places page." (R. at 24.) Prior
to May 9, 2012, the St. Johns Storage Places listing and its contents did not exist
because of any contractual or business relationship between Ramp Realty and
Google. The listing existed only because Google took it upon itself to create it and
publish it to the world.
Google admits it "started the process to determine whether the Google Maps
Places page for st. Johns Storage should be updated to reflect the business was
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closed" around February 15,2012. (R. at 24.) Google claims it does not lmow why
it started this process, but nonetheless Google acknowledges it was the party that
started it. (R. at 24.) Google admits it took it upon itself to change the Places page
three months before Ramp Realty agreed to Google's terms of service.
Ramp Realty's bill of discovery simply seeks to find out more information
about why the Places listing changed in February 2012 (or before). Google freely
admits that when Google changed the Places listing Google and Ramp Realty did
not have a contractual relationship. Without a contractual relationship, Google
could not be providing "Services" to Ramp Realty. Since Google was not
providing Ramp Realty with "Services" when Google changed St. Johns Storage's
Places listing, Ramp Realty's bill of discovery seeking to find out how and why the
Places listing changed does not arise out of or relate to "Services." There is simply
no rational way to argue Ramp Realty's efforts to find out more about why Google
changed the Maps listing in February 20 12 (or before) arise out of or relate to
contractual Services Google did not start providing to Ramp Realty until May 9,
2012.
CONCLUSION

No doubt, Google chose narrower forum selection language to help insure its
forum selection clause would be enforceable. Had Google overtly attempted to
force a forum selection on customers for matters that predated customers' assent to
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Google's terms of service, Google would risk running afoul of the widelyrecognized exception to enforcement of forum selection clauses that arises when
the clause is "the product of overwhelming bargaining power on the part of one
party." See Bombardier Capital, 801 So. 2d at 134. However, Google is trying to
accomplish covertly what it is unwilling to do overtly, namely force any party with
a contractual relationship with Google to bring all legal proceedings involving
Google in Santa Clara County regardless of whether the proceedings have any real
relationship to the contract. This is an overly broad application of Google's forum
selection clause that finds no support in the clause's plain language. Google should
not be allowed to overreach in this manner. Google should be held to the plain
language of its own contract. The language of Google's forum selection clause
does not include Ramp Realty's bill of discovery within its ambit.
Ramp Realty asks this Court to reverse the trial court's order dismissing
Ramp Realty's bill of discovery. Ramp Realty also asks this Court to remand this
case back to the trial court with a mandate instructing the trial court to deny
Google's motion to dismiss.
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